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Abstract 
 
This paper sets to analyze the dynamic feedback between Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and economic growth—larger FDI promotes higher GDP, while higher GDP can 
be achieved with higher levels of FDI. We use panels and a sample of 19 Latin 
American countries to estimate a dynamic FDI and a dynamic GDP equation that 
jointly characterize the evolution of both variables. We find that the dynamics of GDP 
and FDI are mostly driven by the expectations. Shocks of GDP or FDI were found to 
play no role affecting the dynamics. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) for growth and development has been 
extensively documented. Previous work has emphasized on the potential of FDI to increase the volume 
and the efficiency of FDI, its technological diffusion and the improvements in human capital and 
productivity that results from higher levels of competition. FDI is also linked with more efficient 
management and productive methods. These capital flows are immensely important to developing 
countries, which are capital constrained and lack the access to technology and foreign markets that 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have. Because of its importance, there exists intense competition, in 
terms of incentives (i.e. tax incentives and subsidies), between host countries to attract more FDI. 
FDI is especially important for Latin American countries, which have experienced a significant 
increase in these capital inflows since the 1990s. Despite the recent economic crisis, the amount of FDI 
flowing into Latin America and the Caribbean has quickly recovered and returned to its 2007 level, 
standing at around US$ 115 billion per year (10 percent of world flows), maintaining its upward trend for 
the decade with approximately 50 percent more funds flowing into the region than in 2000. This 
renewed interest in the region comes from the relatively strong economic performance of most 
countries in the region, but it is also heavily concentrated in the best performers (i.e. Brazil, Mexico, and 
Chile). A significant part of this recent FDI is driven by the need for primary commodities in fast growing 
emerging countries like China, leading to new investments to extract raw materials (food and metals) 
and hydrocarbons, but another significant part of investment is geared to satisfy domestic markets, as 
the growth in incomes has outpaced those of other regions. 
This paper extends the existing literature by studying the role of expectations in the dynamic 
interaction between FDI and economic growth. Our approach is similar to previous studies that 
acknowledge that FDI and economic growth are jointly determined. This is important because the 
estimation of FDI or growth equations need to account for potential endogeneity. Moreover, static 
models are miss-specified because by ignoring dynamics they force agents to behave myopically (i.e., 
foreign investors do not take into account expectations about growth). Our dynamic specifications not 
only control for endogeneity, but also postulate that such endogeneity is not constrained to 
contemporaneous relationships, but is potentially related to previous realization of FDI and growth. The 
intuition to motivate our approach is straightforward; countries with higher economic growth are able 
3 
 
to attract more FDI. Hence, previous levels of growth affect current FDI. In addition, previous FDI as 
predicted by neoclassical growth models also affects current economic growth. This means that FDI and 
economic growth are jointly determined and current values are the results of previous dynamics of both 
variables.  What is more, economic agents (e.g., tax payers, foreign investors, local consumers) are 
allowed to behave dynamically and form expectation about the future paths of our endogenous 
variables. 
To capture the joint dynamics between FDI and economic growth we follow the feedback 
mechanism described in Bun and Kiviet (2006). More importantly, we employ a two-step approach to 
filter the dynamics to decompose each of the two variables into expected values and shocks. Then, 
rather than just estimating how FDI affects economic growth we differentiate between the effects of 
expected FDI and FDI shocks on growth. The estimation employs the dynamic panel methods described 
in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). These estimators acknowledge that GDP 
growth and FDI are jointly determined while considering that previous dynamics of both are important 
as well. Using our panel of 19 Latin American countries from 1990 through 2011, our results show that 
the dynamics of FDI and growth are mostly driven by expectations – shocks of either FDI or growth have 
no statistically significant effect on the dynamics of these two variables. Specifically, a one percent 
increase in FDI flowing into Latin American countries increases the contemporaneous GDP per capita by 
0.08 percent, and a one percent increase in GDP per capita in the host country increases the inflow of 
FDI by 2.3 percent.  
Because most of the policies geared to improve the performance of a given country are 
implemented taking into consideration the determinants of productivity (i.e., education, taxation, trade, 
and the quality of the institutions), the use of current and past information becomes of upmost 
relevance. This supports our approach of looking at the relationship between FDI and economic growth 
in a dynamic context. Dynamics are important at the Multinational Corporation level as well because 
investment decision are determined based on forecasts of the economic conditions that are expected to 
prevail for investment to be profitable (if the emphasis is in satisfying the domestic market) or for 
production initiatives to be sustainable (if the emphasis is in the world market). Forecasts, which are 
consistent with rational expectations and our estimation methods, are based in materialized behavior. 
Realization of these projections are necessary for the sustainability of governmental policies and 
investment decisions, so fluctuations in the main determinants that can alter predetermined trends 
should be taken into consideration. Expectations change over time and take into account all previous 
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information. Unexpected fluctuations – shocks – can force governments and MNCs to re-evaluate their 
policies (strategies) and may impact FDI and growth in a different way than expected fluctuations. Given 
the nature of fluctuations (which comprise expected fluctuations and shocks), it thus become imperative 
to measure the relevance of how new information (shocks) carries and may have a differentiated effect 
than expected fluctuations on the enactment of policymakers in governments in host countries.  
Most of the previous economic literature on FDI has been devoted to determine the existence 
of growth enhancing links, measured by improvements in GDP per capita growth rates. Theoretical 
models provide the framework for a positive relationship between FDI and economic growth, and most 
empirical studies corroborate this notion with the use of different econometric techniques and samples.  
This positive effect on growth requires some degree of complementary with domestic investment, 
infrastructure, and human capital, at least in the short run (see e.g., De Mello, 1999; Borensztein et al., 
1998; Alfaro et al., 2004; Damijan et al., 2003; UNCTAD, 1999). 
Another branch of the literature has concentrated in the determinants that lead to increases in 
FDI (Tsai, 1994; Delbecque et al., 2007; Olney, 2011; Mogab et al., 2012). FDI is an instrument that 
allows firms to transfer capital, technology, and organizational skills from one country to another, and 
stresses the differences in the cost and quality of productive factors in different countries, looking to 
take advantage of economies of scale in production. MNCs are usually more inclined to penetrate 
foreign markets through FDI when trade costs are high, firm-level scale economies are high, plant-level 
scale economies are low, and when the host-country’s market size is large. They also respond to the 
economic performance of the host country, the existing stock of FDI, the quality of infrastructure, the 
tax burden, labor market rigidity, and the level of industrialization of the receiving economy. Theory 
predicts that firms will penetrate foreign markets through vertical FDI when factor-costs differences 
between countries are large and through horizontal FDI when countries are similar in terms of markets 
size and factor cost. 
One contentious point that arises from the specifications that aim at establishing the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth is the potential joint endogeneity of these variables. This 
has led to statistical testing to disentangle the directional causality, which has proven complicated 
because tests and solid arguments suggests both, that higher levels of FDI will fuel higher rates of 
growth and that higher rates of economic growth will generate higher levels of FDI flowing into the 
country. Our approach is closest to Choe (2003) who jointly estimates equations for growth and FDI 
using a panel VAR. He shows that there exists a strong positive association between FDI inflows and 
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economic growth – FDI Granger-causes growth, and vice versa. Our approach uses internal instruments 
to control for the potential endogeneity of growth and FDI. While a VAR approach only allows estimating 
the effects of shocks on dynamics, our two-step approach using dynamic panels allows us to estimate 
the effects of shocks and expected changes on the dynamics of both variables.  
FDI studies in Latin American countries include Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) who show 
that economic freedom increases capital inflows, and Campos and Kinoshita (2008) who find that 
financial liberalization and institutions are important. Montero (2008) presents an overview of the 
determinants of FDI while Blanco (2012) finds no evidence that FDI is spatially autocorrelated, but 
surrounding market potential has a positive effect on FDI. Ruiz and Pozo (2008) study the exchange-rate 
uncertainty effects on FDI. Beyond Latin America, Li and Liu (2005) use a sample of 84 countries over the 
period 1970-99 to find that the interaction of human capital and FDI exerts a strong positive effect on 
economic growth on developing countries.  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
data. The motivation and estimation strategies of the FDI and economic growth equations are presented 
in Section 3. Section 4 reports and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The data for this study comes primarily from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI), and is complemented with data from the Inter-American Development Bank’s LA&C Macro 
Economic Watch database for the terms of trade index, data from Freedom in the World for data on 
political rights, and data from Barro and Lee’s Educational Attainment Dataset for our measure of 
educational attainment (extrapolated for yearly frequency). The sample used is composed of 19 Latin 
American countries and encompasses the period 1990-2011, with yearly observations. The sample 
excludes countries that are too small, have special governmental controls, or lack adequate data. The 
countries in the sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. 
[Table 1, here] 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (in five-year averages) of the variables used in the analysis. 
As it can be observed, both the real GDP growth rate and FDI have experienced and increase throughout 
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the period, but stagnated between the 1995-99 and the 2000-04 periods, with the dispersion of GDP per 
capita increasing in the last period while the dispersion of FDI actually decreasing in that same period. 
The population growth rate in the region has continuously declined and the educational level (measured 
by the average number of years of secondary schooling) has steadily increased, ending up with an 
increase of approximately 40 percent relative to the 1990-94 time period – although it is becoming more 
dispersed. We also see that the share of investment as a proportion of GDP has remained pretty stable 
during the first three time periods, but it has experience a 5 percent decline in the most recent period – 
relative to the initial time period. As far as the openness of these economies is concerned, the data 
shows that Latin American economies are increasingly engaged in international trade – as measured by 
total trade as a percentage of GDP – and are experiencing a significant improvement in their terms of 
trade, although the variation amongst countries has increased through time for our last measure. The 
behavior of the cost of capital shows a similar picture in terms of fluctuations, with both the domestic 
real interest rate and the foreign lending rate first increasing and then declining steadily. The measure of 
political stability used in the study shows a stable pattern, with a small improvement in the 1995-99 
time period, but the measure proxying for infrastructure (number of telephone lines per 100 people) 
shows a continuous improvement throughout the period considered. It should also be noted that there 
is significant variation among countries in all our measures (reflected in the standard deviation).    
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1. The Dynamic Growth Equation 
The empirical strategy to characterize the dynamic feedback between FDI and economic growth 
follows Bun and Kiviet (2006). This involves the specification of one dynamic equation for each of these 
variables. We first specify the dynamic growth equation in a similar fashion than most of the economic 
growth literature. We augment Islam (1995)’s growth equation to include FDI in the following way: 
  = ,	 + 	fdi +  +	 + αℎ +  +  +     (1) 
where   is the logarithm of per capita GPD of country	 at time , fdi 	is the logarithm of FDI,  is the 
population growth rate,  is the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP (ratio of domestic investment 
to real GDP), and ℎ  is human capital (measured as the average number of years of secondary 
schooling). The variables in the matrix  are controls commonly included in the growth cross-country 
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studies: a measure of trade (i.e., the ratio of trade to GDP), a terms-of-trade index, and a variable to 
capture political rights.   captures the time-invariant country-specific effects, while  denotes the 
remaining disturbance term. 
The correct specification and the assumption on the contemporaneous correlation between 
fdi and  are crucial to obtain consistent estimates of the main coefficient of interest, the effect of fdi 
on . For example, even though we are not directly interested on the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, including the autoregressive term allows for the existence of dynamics in the 
underlying process. This will take into account the possibility that correlation between economic growth 
and foreign direct investment arises merely from a dynamic common driving force. Because it is easy to 
argue that foreign investors’ decision today is affected by previous levels of per capita GDP, we will 
consider fdi to be endogenous in a panel data sense. That is, assuming that the error terms  are 
serially uncorrelated, fdi  is modeled as endogenous if we allow it to be correlated with 
contemporaneous and previous shocks, but it must not be correlated with future shocks, 
 fdi ≠ 0,					 < fdi = 0,					 ≥ %    for all .       (2) 
 Notice that this is more flexible than the traditional treatment of endogeneity using 
Instrumental Variables (IV), and two (or three) stage least squares, where only contemporaneous 
correlation is allowed and dynamics are ruled out by construction. The error term  corresponds to the 
random part of the GDP per capita that cannot be predicted based on previous variables. The 
assumption of serially uncorrelated disturbances means that previous unexpected changes in the GDP 
per capita cannot be used to predict future unexpected changes.1 This specification still allows 
governments to take into consideration their forecast in terms of future FDI inflows in order to enact 
and implement policy that can affect GDP growth. 
 
3.2. The Dynamic FDI Equation 
The specification of the FDI equation is also standard in the economic literature. Specifically, 
following Li and Liu (2005) we have: 
 fdi = &fdi,	 + &	 + & + &ℎ + &Trade + +, + - + .,   (3) 
                                                           
1
 This assumption will be tested as part of the estimation procedure. 
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where Trade is the ratio of trade to GDP. The rest of the variables are the same as in Equation (1), 
while the matrix + follows Li and Liu (2005) and contains controls such as the terms of trade index, a 
measure of political rights, real interest rate, the London Interbank offered rate, and a proxy for 
infrastructure (i.e., telephone lines per 100 people). The time-invariant country-specific effect is 
captured by -, and .  is the random error term that is independent from all random variables 
introduced so far. 
 With serially uncorrelated disturbances,   will be modeled as endogenous. That is, the 
estimation strategy allows   to be correlated with previous and contemporaneous shocks ., but   
has to be uncorrelated with future shocks, 
 . ≠ 0,					 < . = 0,					 ≥ %    for all .       (4) 
Modeling   as endogenous does not prevent economic agents from forming forward looking 
perspectives. We allow foreign investors (MNCs) to have their own beliefs about future values of the 
GDP per capita. That is, we retain the ability to use forecasts of GDP growth in the determination of the 
investment strategies to be pursued by MNCs.  
 
3.3. Estimation Methodology 
To allow for the dynamic feedback between   and fdi and to obtain consistent estimates of 
the coefficients of interest, 	 in Equation (1) and &	 in Equation (3), we will use two dynamic panel data 
estimators; one is the difference GMM estimator proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and 
Bond (1991), and the other one is the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The first estimator works by taking first differences to eliminate the unobserved time-invariant country-
specific characteristic (i.e.,  or .). Then a vector of instruments / is needed to construct moments 
∆/  for the estimation of the GDP equation, and a vector of instruments 1 for moments ∆.1  
in the estimation of the FDI equation. Under serially uncorrelated  and under equations (2), fdi and 
its lags are valid instruments for ∆fdi in the GDP equation in first differences. Likewise, with no first 
order serial correlation in .,   and its lags are valid instruments for ∆ in the first-differenced FDI 
equation. 
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 The system GMM estimator is used because Blundell and Bond (1998) pointed out a statistical 
shortcoming with the difference GMM estimator. If   and fdi are persistent over time then these 
variables and its lags will be weak instruments for the equations in first differences. Therefore we will 
also report the system GMM estimates as proposed by Blundell and Bond. The idea is to combine the 
equation in first differences and the equation in levels. The additional moment conditions for the GDP 
equation in levels are 2 +  34 = 0 and for the FDI equation in levels are 2- + . 54 = 0. 
Hence, we need the additional sets of instruments 3 and 5. Blundell and Bond propose using ∆fdi, 
∆, and its lags as instruments.  
 
3.4. Expectations and Shocks 
Notice that we can write Equations (1) and (3) to break down the dynamics of   and the 
dynamics of fdi in two different components:  
  = 6|,	, fdi ,  , , ℎ , , , , 8 + ,     (5) 
 fdi = 6fdi|fdi,	,  ,  , ℎ , Trade, +, &, ,, -8 + ..    (6) 
The first component on the right-hand side of each of the equations is the expected or anticipated part 
of   or fdi, respectively. Hence  and . represent the unanticipated (shocks) components. The 
evolution of the expected components is consistent with rational expectation models, where agents 
form their expectations based on Equations (1) and (3).  
 Once the coefficients of the GDP and FDI equations are estimated, we can also estimate the 
expected components by just simply computing the fitted values of the estimated equations. Moreover, 
the shocks can be obtained as the regression residuals. That is, 24 = 9:  and 2fdi4 = fdı9< , and the 
estimated shocks are 9: =  − 24 and .9< = fdi − 2fdi4. This is useful because we can replace 
  and fdi in Equations (1) and (3) with their two additively separable expected and unexpected 
component to estimate the marginal effects, 
  = ,	 + >2fdi4	+	?@fdi − 2fdi4A +  +	 + αℎ +  +  +   
            (7) 
 fdi = &fdi,	 + &>24 +	&?@ − 24A 	+ & + &ℎ + &Trade + +, + - + ..  
10 
 
            (8) 
The hypotheses of interest is then not only to see if the marginal effects are significant, but also 
test if the marginal effect of the expected component is the same as the marginal effects of a shock (i.e., 
1:	> = ? and 1:	&> = &?). This set up thus allows us to examine the response that our measure of 
interest will have for a given change in the expected component but also from the unexpected 
component. In other words, economic actors – and the government – will take into consideration past 
and current realization of FDI to determine their actions, and thus the behavior of GDP. This will be 
reflected in the effect of the expected component of FDI on GDP per capita. Furthermore, the 
specification also allows for economic actors to react to unexpected fluctuations in FDI in the 
determination of their behavior, and thus on GDP per capita. This will be measured by the coefficient of 
the unexpected component. Of course, the same logic applies to the FDI specification, where we analyze 
the influence of the expected and unexpected components of GDP per capita on FDI inflows. 
 The estimation of Equations (7) and (8) uses the same methods as before. The two components 
of   and fdi will be treated as potentially endogenous — correlated with contemporaneous and 
previous shocks. In this two-step approach the expected and unexpected components used in the 
second step are generated regressors that come from the first step. Including only the shocks or only 
the expected components would yield incorrect standard errors. Equations (7) and (8) follow model 4 in 
Pagan (1984) and accounts for the estimation error in the first step by including both components — the 
expected and the shock — in the estimation of the second-step. 
The key identification assumption in the first-step estimation is that there is no serial correlation 
in the error terms. We test for the validity of this assumption during the discussion of the results. This is 
important for the interpretation of the shocks in the second step. No serial correlation means that the 
current error term cannot be predicted based on previous error terms or previous values of the GDP, FDI 
or the other variables in the model. Then testing whether the resulting error term in the first step has no 
serial correlation is in fact a test of whether the unexpected component used in the second step is 
indeed a shock. 
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4. Results 
4.1. The Growth Equation 
Table 2 reports the results from the estimation of Equation (1). For comparison purposes the 
first two columns treat fdi as a strictly exogenous regressor. The benefit in the Within specification in 
the second column is that it additionally controls for any observed or unobserved time-invariant 
country-specific characteristics. Consistent with the Monte Carlo simulations in Blundell et al. (2000), 
the estimate of the autoregressive term in the first column appears upwards-biased while the Within 
appears downwards-biased. Moreover, also consistent with Blundell et al. (2000), the estimate of the 
coefficient on fdi appears negatively biased in the Pooled OLS specification and to a lesser extent in 
the Within specification. 
[Table 2, here] 
 Columns (3) and (4) treat fdi as endogenous. Moreover, the autoregressive term, the ratio of 
capital gross formation to GDP (), and our measure of human capital (ℎ) are treated as potentially 
endogenous as well. The population growth () and the controls variables in  are treated as 
exogenous. The validity of these two specifications is tested with three specification tests. First, a 
second-order serial correlation test on the differenced error term is used to assess whether the 
assumption of no first-order serial correlation is met. The large p-values in both columns show strong 
support for a valid specification. Second, to test the overall validity of the instrument list we use the 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. The results in both specifications show strong evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis that instrument list is not correlated with the residuals.2 Finally, to test for the 
validity of the additional instrument list in the system GMM specification we use the difference Sargan 
test. The p-value in the last column validates these additional instruments.3  
 The main coefficient of interest — the marginal effect of fdi on   — has a positive sign that is 
robust across all specifications. In our preferred specification — column 4 — the magnitude of the 
coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in Foreign Direct Investment increases the 
contemporaneous GDP per capita by 0.08 percent. This effect is statistically significant at at least 10% 
                                                           
2
 In the difference GMM the instruments for ,	 are the second through the fourth lags. The instruments for 
fdi ,  , and ℎ are its second and third lags. Because the rest of the variables are treated as exogenous, we 
instrument for them in the moment conditions with ∆ , and ∆. 
3
 The additional instruments used in the levels equation for the system GMM specification are ∆,	, ∆fdi,	, 
∆,	, and ∆ℎ,	. 
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level. When comparing the magnitude of the coefficient across columns, we see that the effect is larger 
after controlling for the potential endogeneity of fdi. The fact that the coefficients across specifications 
are different is evidence that controlling for endogeneity is key to obtain consistent estimates of the 
marginal effect. 
 
4.2. The FDI Equation 
The estimates of the FDI equation are reported in Table 3. The first two columns assume that   is 
strictly exogenous, while columns three and four relax this assumption. Furthermore, the specifications 
from columns two through four control for country-specific characteristics. The biases of the Pooled OLS 
and the Within specification are consistent with the known biases found in Blundell et al. (2000); the 
coefficient of the autoregressive term appears to be upwards-biased in the Pooled OLS, while the 
estimates on   appear to be downwards-biased in the first two columns. 
[Table 3, here] 
The GMM specifications in the third and fourth columns model   as potentially endogenous. 
Moreover, fdi,	, ℎ, and Trade are treated as endogenous as well. The population growth rate () 
and the set of controls in the matrix + are all modeled as exogenous. All three specification tests for the 
GMM estimators strongly support the validity of the no-serial-correlation assumption and the 
instrument lists.4 Our main coefficient of interest is the marginal effect of   on fdi. The estimate in 
the last column suggests a positive and highly statistically significant effect: a one percent increase in 
GDP per capita increases FDI by 2.3%.  
 
4.3. Expectations 
We now turn to analyze how the expected and the unexpected components of FDI affect GDP 
per capita, and how the expected and the unexpected components of GDP per capita affect FDI. The 
results of the estimation of equations (7) and (8) are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The 
                                                           
4
 In the difference equations the instruments for fdi,	 are its second, third, and fourth lags. For , ℎ, and 
Trade, the instruments are its second and third lags. For the strictly exogenous variables , and the matrix +, 
the instruments are simply ∆, and ∆+. In the levels equations the additional instruments are ∆fdi,	, ∆,	, 
∆,	, and ∆Trade,	. 
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measures for expected	fdi and the fdi	shock employed in Table 4 are obtained from the estimates in 
the fourth column of Table 3. Moreover, these measures of expected	 and  	shock used in Table 5 
come from the estimates in the system GMM specification of Table 2. All specifications in both tables 
pass the three specification tests. The robustness checks in the GDP equation includes one at the time 
the variables in , while the robustness results for the FDI equation has different specifications for the 
matrix of controls +.  
[Table 4, here] 
 The results in Table 4 show that only the expected component of fdi has an statistically 
significant effect on GDP. Across all columns of the table the marginal effects are statistically significant 
at least at the one percent1% confidence level. The interpretation of the coefficient in the last column 
indicates that a one percent increase in expected FDI increases the GDP per capita of the host country 
by 0.25 percent. However, an increase in the FDI that comes as a surprise does not have any effect on 
per capita GDP. Furthermore, the bottom part of the table reports the p-values of the null hypothesis 
that the marginal effect of the expected FDI is equal to the marginal effect of an FDI shock (i.e., 
1:	> = ?). Across all specifications we reject the null. 
[Table 5, here] 
 The results for Equation 8 (presented in Table 5) appear to show a similar pattern; the expected 
component of   has an impact on FDI, but there is no statistically significant effect of the FDI shocks. 
Moreover, the null hypothesis that the marginal effects of the expected components and the shock is 
the same is rejected in most of the specifications, but not all. When controlling for political rights, the 
real interest rate, the interbank rate, or infrastructure, the results hold. Overall the estimates from these 
two tables are clear: the dynamic between these two variables is channeled through expectations. The 
shock on any of these variables has no statistically significant effect on the system.5 
 
 
 
                                                           
5
 Escobari (2012) uses a similar two-step procedure to estimate a dynamic supply and a dynamic demand for a 
perishable product. He finds that in the supply side the dynamics are dominated by the shocks. See also Escobari 
and Mollick (2013) for the role of unexpected government expenditures on output growth. 
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5. Conclusion 
Most of the economic literature on FDI examines the impact that these type of inflows can have 
on the economic performance of the host country, and while the most recent studies control for the 
endogenous relationship between FDI and GDP per capita (i.e. Islam, 1995; Li and Liu, 2005; Bengoa and 
Sanchez-Robles, 2003; and Choe, 2003), their empirical specifications does not allow to assess 
differentiated effects of expectations and shocks. This paper sets to analyze the importance of 
expectations in the dynamic feedback between FDI and per capita GDP by incorporating the expected 
and unexpected components in the estimation of the GDP per capita and FDI equations. The results 
show that there is an important dynamic feedback between GDP per capita and FDI, where 
contemporaneous values are jointly determined based on the previous sequence of both variables and 
the controls. On the one hand higher levels of FDI promote higher levels of GDP per capita, while on the 
other hand higher levels of GDP per capita in the host country serves to attract higher levels of FDI. Our 
estimation approach specifically allows for this dynamic interaction where economic agents can behave 
dynamically and form expectations about the future path of both variables. 
 To analyze the role of expectations we use a two step approach where in the first step we 
estimate two equations that characterize the dynamics of both variables. We then use the estimates of 
this first step to break down the evolution of GDP per capita and FDI into their expected and unexpected 
components. In the second step we allow for a differentiated marginal effect of the expectations and 
the shocks of each of the variables on the other. The results show strong evidence that the dynamic 
feedback between these two variables is almost entirely driven by expectations, with the unexpected 
component lacking any influence. Shocks on any of the two variables do not have a statistically 
significant effect on the dynamics. 
These results are important in the implementation of growth enhancing policies in the host 
countries and specific investment strategies by MNCs because they indicate that information on the 
expected component of GDP per capita and FDI are sufficient to form reliable forecast in which to base 
future actions. In other words, economic actors – and the government (MNCs) – should continue to take 
into consideration past and current realization of FDI (GDP per capita) to determine their actions, and 
thus the behavior of GDP per capita (FDI). Indeed, the lack of statistical significance on the unexpected 
components suggests that these unexpected fluctuations are muted, and thus can safely be ignored.  
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations 
VARIABLES (1990-4) (1995-9) (2000-4) (2005-10) 
  7.656    
(0.781) 
7.901    
(0.782) 
7.813    
(0.746) 
8.162    
(0.792) 
Expected	 7.706    
(0.619) 
7.907    
(0.711) 
7.857    
(0.688) 
8.089    
(0.702) 
 	shock 0.014     
(0.160) 
-0.011    
(0.212) 
-0.038     
(0.186) 
0.039     
(0.172) 
fdi 5.322    
(1.900) 
6.530    
(1.991) 
6.536    
(1.948) 
7.263    
(1.775) 
Expected	fdi 5.552    
(2.241) 
6.458    
(2.635) 
6.515    
(2.886) 
7.296    
(3.149) 
fdi	shock -0.278    
(1.922) 
0.095     
(2.043) 
0.002    
(2.026) 
0.075    
(2.344) 
 1.995    
(0.465) 
1.767    
(0.500) 
1.516    
(0.576) 
1.367    
(0.516) 
ℎ 1.729    
(0.603) 
1.915    
(0.626) 
2.123    
(0.639) 
2.401    
(0.688) 
 0.192     
(0.061) 
0.188    
(0.057) 
0.193    
(0.041) 
0.180    
(0.053) 
Trade 0.578      
(0.370) 
0.608    
(0.353) 
0.650    
(0.289) 
0.719    
(0.305) 
Terms	of	Trade	Index	 101.343    
(20.172) 
109.016    
(27.243) 
107.977    
(26.648) 
122.531    
(51.166) 
O 10.613    
(24.742) 
18.236    
(16.916) 
13.984    
(15.393) 
8.564    
(10.147) 
Interbank	O 5.667    
(1.688) 
5.856    
(.241) 
3.279    
(1.981) 
2.984    
(1.782) 
Political	Rights 2.621    
(1.338) 
2.736    
(1.338) 
2.568    
(1.285) 
2.511    
(1.138) 
Infrastructure 6.207    
(4.108) 
9.758    
(6.291) 
12.924    
(7.884) 
15.133    
(8.171) 
     
Note: Standard Deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 2. GDP Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS GMM 
   
VARIABLES Pooled Within Difference System 
     
yW,X	 0.931*** 0.680*** 0.350*** 0.715*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0438) (0.0875) (0.136) 
fdiWX 0.0177*** 0.0486*** 0.119*** 0.0839* 
 (0.00550) (0.0149) (0.0262) (0.0452) 
nWX -0.00526 0.0977 0.780*** 0.125 
 (0.0151) (0.0908) (0.228) (0.212) 
sWX -0.223 -0.671* -2.177** -0.292 
 (0.140) (0.322) (0.889) (0.710) 
hWX 0.00292 0.124** 0.773*** 0.0721 
 (0.00873) (0.0585) (0.229) (0.139) 
TradeWX 0.000201 0.000135 0.000657 -7.29e-05 
 (0.000240) (0.000637) (0.00150) (0.00139) 
Trade	Index	WX 0.000603* 0.00170*** 0.00152** 0.000656 
 (0.000342) (0.000277) (0.000746) (0.000955) 
Political	RightsWX -0.0143 -0.0161 -0.0195 -0.0163 
 (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.0222) (0.0342) 
     
Serial correlation a   -0.189 -0.0306 
Serial correlation (p-value) a   0.850 0.976 
Sargan b   9.727 14.45 
Sargan (p-value) b   1 1 
Difference Sargan (p-value) c    1 
Notes: The dependent variable is . Figures in parentheses for the OLS specifications are White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the asymptotic standard errors. For the GMM 
specifications are the Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors of the GMM two-step 
estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is 
that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid 
specification). b The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals 
(valid specification). c The null hypothesis is that the additional instruments used in the levels 
equation are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). 
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Table 3. FDI Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS GMM 
   
VARIABLES Pooled Within Difference System 
     
fdi,	 0.829*** 0.435*** 0.0302 0.259 
 (0.0561) (0.0679) (0.145) (0.282) 
  0.253** 1.001*** 2.513*** 2.308*** 
 (0.101) (0.201) (0.576) (0.653) 
 0.0185 -0.468* -1.510 -0.0558 
 (0.0789) (0.263) (1.302) (1.236) 
ℎ 0.125 -0.133 -2.216** -1.655* 
 (0.0995) (0.248) (1.009) (0.964) 
Trade -0.00287** 0.00715 -0.00178 -0.00404 
 (0.00141) (0.00490) (0.00502) (0.00874) 
Political	Rights -0.0254 -0.122 -0.128 -0.0651 
 (0.0358) (0.0813) (0.118) (0.124) 
O -0.00706 -0.00558 -0.00267 -0.00559 
 (0.00512) (0.00335) (0.00299) (0.00421) 
Interbank	O 0.0297* 0.0365* 0.0195 -0.00523 
 (0.0153) (0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0362) 
Infrastructure -0.00688 0.0122 0.101 0.142 
 (0.00430) (0.0158) (0.103) (0.123) 
     
Serial correlation a   -1.277 -0.580 
Serial correlation (p-value) a   0.201 0.562 
Sargan b   10.09 9.420 
Sargan (p-value) b   1 1 
Difference Sargan (p-value) c    1 
Notes: The dependent variable is fdi. See notes on Table 2. 
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Table 4. System GMM Estimation of the GDP Equation with Expectations and Shocks. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
,	 0.185 0.147 0.433*** 0.178 0.168 
 (0.123) (0.141) (0.0894) (0.142) (0.133) 
Expected	fdi 0.254*** 0.262*** 0.160*** 0.251*** 0.253*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0493) (0.0296) (0.0487) (0.0468) 
fdi	shock 0.0326 0.0307 0.0308 0.0424 0.0264 
 (0.0229) (0.0231) (0.0381) (0.0268) (0.0290) 
 0.697*** 0.685*** 0.246** 0.678*** 0.741*** 
 (0.198) (0.227) (0.122) (0.226) (0.254) 
 -0.868** -0.991** -0.413 -0.699* -0.731 
 (0.379) (0.448) (0.429) (0.384) (0.543) 
ℎ 0.534*** 0.536*** 0.302** 0.508*** 0.552*** 
 (0.135) (0.161) (0.128) (0.168) (0.193) 
Trade  0.000805   0.000462 
  (0.00108)   (0.000972) 
Trade	Index	   0.000210  0.000524 
   (0.000640)  (0.000628) 
Political	Rights    -0.0120 -0.000438 
    (0.0151) (0.0335) 
      
1:	> = ? (p-value) d 1.47e-07 5.99e-08 3.54e-05 9.22e-06 2.17e-09 
Serial correlation a 0.113 0.0394 -0.180 0.0246 0.178 
Serial correlation (p-value) a 0.910 0.969 0.857 0.980 0.859 
Sargan b 8.659 8.485 14.48 7.865 9.356 
Sargan (p-value) b 1 1 1 1 1 
Difference Sargan (p-value) c 1 1 1 1 1 
Notes: The dependent variable is . d The null hypothesis is that the coefficient on the expected 
component is the same as the coefficient on the shock. See notes on Table 2. Expected	fdi and 	
fdi	shock are obtained from the last column of Table 3. 
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Table 5. System GMM Estimation of the FDI Equation with Expectations and Shocks 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
fdi,	 0.344*** 0.335*** 0.286** 0.292*** 0.383*** -0.0379 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.136) (0.113) (0.141) (0.294) 
Expected	 2.291*** 2.377*** 2.247*** 2.572*** 2.285*** 2.731*** 
 (0.602) (0.619) (0.628) (0.651) (0.606) (0.995) 
 	shock 1.410 1.436 -0.252 0.856 1.482 -0.448 
 (0.927) (0.932) (0.620) (0.749) (0.938) (0.713) 
 -1.744** -1.748** -1.121 -1.829** -1.989** 2.255 
 (0.737) (0.739) (0.834) (0.743) (0.895) (2.167) 
ℎ -1.519* -1.493* -0.927 -1.876** -1.469* -0.432 
 (0.798) (0.803) (0.731) (0.839) (0.803) (1.212) 
Trade -0.00191 -0.00279 -0.00343 0.00360 -0.00171 0.00103 
 (0.00590) (0.00607) (0.00421) (0.00639) (0.00588) (0.00726) 
Political	Rights  0.0493    -0.222 
  (0.0935)    (0.422) 
O   -0.0137***   -0.0109** 
   (0.00229)   (0.00468) 
Interbank	O    0.0154  -0.0142 
    (0.0167)  (0.0328) 
Infrastructure     -0.0322 0.223 
     (0.0647) (0.170) 
       
1:	&> = &? (p-value) d 0.347 0.320 0.000480 0.0327 0.404 0.0101 
Serial correlation a -0.429 -0.266 -1.369 -0.273 -0.250 -0.404 
Serial correlation (p-value) a 0.668 0.790 0.171 0.785 0.803 0.686 
Sargan b 10.99 10.61 14.56 10.15 10.75 11.26 
Sargan (p-value) b 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Difference Sargan (p-value) c 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Notes: The dependent variable is fdi. d The null hypothesis is that the coefficient on the expected 
component is the same as the coefficient on the shock. See notes on Table 2. Expected	  and 	
 	shock are obtained from the last column of Table 2. 
 
